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ABSTRACT 
In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the United States Supreme 
Court heightened scrutiny of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement and imposed a strict 
injunctive standard for relief sought under FRCP Rule 23(b)(2). In 2007, the 
Missouri Supreme Court followed several other states in acknowledging that 
claimants tortiously exposed to toxins may seek medical monitoring for latent 
disease in a class action. Although state courts are not bound by federal 
procedural rules, class actions increasingly invoke federal jurisdiction, and 
this Article attempts to analyze the likely implications of Dukes for toxic 
exposure class actions. Further, using Missouri as a benchmark, this Article 
provides suggestions for bolstering the chances of recovery for toxic 
exposure claimants facing removal to federal courts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Medical monitoring is theoretically simple: a defendant that exposes 
persons to harmful substances must pay for periodic medical treatment to 
detect and mitigate latent diseases potentially caused by the exposure.1 Yet, 
after nearly thirty years of decisions,2 medical monitoring remains amorphous 
and unsettled.3 As medical monitoring claims are most often brought in the 
context of mass exposure to toxins and harmful products, sometimes 
involving thousands of claimants, they inevitably intersect with procedural 
rules governing class actions. Although state courts are not bound by federal 
procedural rules, many states have class action rules nearly identical to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23).4 Because medical monitoring 
claims often involve defendants operating in different jurisdictions from the 
claimants they expose, diversity of citizenship implicates federal jurisdiction. 
Rule 23's procedural requirements will apply to medical monitoring claims 
based on state law. This is especially true after enactment of the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which significantly federalized class action 
suits.5 
This paper considers the effect of federal procedural law on state 
medical monitoring class actions, focusing specifically on toxic exposure in 
Missouri. Part II introduces policy arguments for and against medical 
monitoring and describes how medical monitoring fits within the legal 
landscape. Part III describes Rule 23 and how medical monitoring operates 
under Rule 23. Further, it details the Missouri Supreme Court's analysis of 
Rule 23 and recognition of medical monitoring in a 2007 class action, Meyer 
                                                             
1 See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra note 6. 
3 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.6 Part IV describes the class certification analysis 
outlined in the Supreme Court's 2011 decision of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes,7 which heightened the scrutiny of class certification under the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).8 The Court also imposed a strict 
injunctive standard to relief sought under Rule 23(b), with reservation on 
whether monetary claims "incidental" to injunctive claims should be 
allowed.9 
The stringent analysis in Dukes is likely to impose significant barriers to 
class certification in federal courts. These barriers will be especially difficult 
to surmount for medical monitoring claimants who must navigate 
complicated causation issues in toxic torts,10 and likely have no statutory 
remedy.11 Part IV also discusses how Dukes has already affected the 
certification of a putative medical monitoring class in the Third Circuit and 
considers other outcomes for medical monitoring post-Dukes. Finally, Part V 
offers suggestions for how Missouri courts, litigants, and legislators should 
respond to Dukes to preserve medical monitoring for victims of toxic 
exposure in class actions in federal courts. 
                                                             
6 Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007). 
In Meyer, the court overturned denial of class certification for a proposed 
class of children seeking medical monitoring following exposure to lead from 
a local smelter, determining common issues sufficiently predominated over 
individual issues to satisfy Missouri's version of Rule 23(b)(3). See infra 
notes 100–07 and accompanying text. 
7 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
8 See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 125–31 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
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II. MEDICAL MONITORING: POLICY AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 
Anchored in tort law, medical monitoring most often arises in the 
context of mass exposure to toxins or harmful products, often in class action 
litigation.12 At its core, medical monitoring allows plaintiffs exposed to toxic 
substances to recover the costs to detect, and thereby prevent or mitigate, 
latent diseases through ongoing medical testing and examination.13 Thus, 
medical monitoring claims "are akin to [tort] claims for enhanced risks of 
future injury, except that they seek to recover the expected cost of 
preventative medical treatment necessitated by another's wrongful conduct 
rather than a percentage of the value of the ultimate harm expected to flow 
from [it]."14 Medical monitoring is necessarily tied to complex causation 
issues in toxic torts, and after nearly thirty years of case law,15 courts remain 
                                                             
12 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1702–03 (2002). 
13 See Daniel L. Martens & Ernest J. Getto, Medical Monitoring and 
Class Actions, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 225, 225 (2003); Meyer ex rel. 
Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. 2007) (citing Ayers v. 
Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987)); Pankaz Venugopal, The 
Class Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1659, 1659 (2002) (explaining that a core justification for medical monitoring 
is that "uninsured plaintiffs ought not have to pay out of their own pockets"). 
14 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1702. See In re Paoli R. Yard 
PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). 
15 The first medical monitoring case was initially filed in 1975. See 
Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 87 F.R.D. 560, 562 
(D.D.C. 1980). Friends for All Children involved 150 Vietnamese orphans 
who survived a military transport plane crash and later sought medical 
surveillance to determine if cabin depressurization could cause brain damage. 
Id. at 561–62. Analogizing to a car crash where the plaintiff could recover the 
expenses associated with post-crash diagnostic examination, the court held 
monitoring was necessary despite the lack of present physical injury. Friends 
for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
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in conflict over its place in the law. In various courts, medical monitoring has 
been allowed or denied, premised on present physical injury or not, 
categorized as a claim or a remedy, and as legal or equitable. This section will 
attempt to explain this amorphous and complex legal issue. 
A. MEDICAL MONITORING POLICY 
Medical monitoring is anchored in tort law and the reason is simple: 
statutory remedies are often lacking for toxic exposure. The environmental 
regulatory regime in the United States is strong, but not all encompassing. 
For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act may help prevent 
toxic exposure through enhanced management and disposal oversight of solid 
and hazardous wastes.16 And the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act establishes federal liability to ensure the 
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste once contamination has occurred.17 Yet, 
these statutes leave the social costs of hazardous waste and toxic exposure 
unaddressed, forcing injured and exposed plaintiffs to seek redress in state 
tort law.18 This is perhaps the strongest argument for allowing medical 
monitoring. 
                                                             
16 RCRA requires that "the generation of hazardous waste is to be 
reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible," and all waste generated 
"should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and 
future threat to human health and the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) 
(2006). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
18 See Beko Reblitz-Richardson, Lockheed Martin and California's 
Limits on Class Treatment for Medical Monitoring Claims, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
615, 616–17 & nn.1–2, 6–7 (2004); ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG ET AL., TOXIC AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 8–9 (2011) (listing various 
public laws and noting that tort law plays an important role in filling 
regulatory gaps). 
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However, toxic exposure is an extraordinarily complex area of tort law, 
particularly on the element of causation.19 The plaintiff's exposure may have 
been caused by multiple, and sometimes indeterminate or defunct, 
defendants.20 Plaintiffs may have widely varied durations and dosages of 
exposure. Some plaintiffs may be presently injured, while others are only at 
risk of future injury from exposure-related diseases with long latency 
periods.21 Further, the risk of disease may depend on other environmental and 
individual issues, such as the synergistic effect of other chemicals, or a 
plaintiff's medical and genetic history.22 Many of these issues are complicated 
                                                             
19 See, e.g., CRAIG ET AL., supra note 18, at 159. Historically, causation 
issues were not a large concern, but as toxic torts arose in the last half of the 
1900s, "proof of causation has become one of the most complex and 
controversial aspects of tort liability." Id. Causation issues include: 
the division of the causal question into questions of specific 
and general causation, the relevance of the temporal order on 
the question of causation, the need for statistical evidence of 
the relationship between substance and disease . . . the 
existence of multiple defendants exposing plaintiff to the same 
substance, the long latency period between exposure and 
disease, the fact that the causes of many diseases are unknown, 
and the role of probabilistic evidence as proof of causation. 
Id. at 165. 
20 Id. at 230. With characteristic toxic torts like asbestos, claimants are 
often exposed to multiple defendants' products, exacerbating already complex 
causation issues. Id. As toxic injuries with long latency periods have 
increased, so have problems of identifying defendants, and the corresponding 
need to shift the causal burden to defendants when plaintiffs cannot determine 
which particular defendant caused the exposure at issue. Id. at 261. 
21 See id. at 228–29 (discussing latency as a barrier to establishing 
causation); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997) 
(noting the risk of conflict between asbestos claimants with present or future 
injury). 
22 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 430 (2d ed. 2000) (listing factors affecting individual exposure 
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by rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony,23 and judicially 
imposed thresholds for the relative risk of disease a plaintiff must 
demonstrate to establish causation.24 
Given these causation issues, concerns of fundamental fairness, based in 
part on perceived conflicts between presently and latently injured plaintiffs, 
have fueled criticism of medical monitoring. Critics argue that a permissive 
medical monitoring policy may risk bankrupting defendants who are forced 
to pay for a costly, long-term medical monitoring program to detect future 
injuries, placing plaintiffs with present injury at a disadvantage and possibly 
leaving them without redress.25 They further caution that due to the 
                                                                                                                              
such as activity level, age, sex, and genetic make-up); CRAIG ET AL., supra 
note 18, at 219 ("Traditionally, unless a disease is a 'signature disease,' i.e., a 
disease known to be caused almost exclusively by exposure to a particular 
substance, there has been no way to distinguish between the causes of an 
ailment based on the ailment itself. . . . The emerging field of genomics offers 
hope" for linking the disease to particular toxins); Dafler v. Raymark 
Industries, Inc., 611 A.2d 136, 140 (N.J. Super. 1992) (discussing 
epidemiological evidence of "multiplicative or synergistic," as opposed to 
merely "additive," effects of asbestos and smoking on the relative risk of lung 
cancer). 
23 See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 18, at 291 ("[T]oxic tort cases often turn 
on complicated testimony from expert witnesses. . . . [L]awyers often expend 
significant resources litigating the admissibility of such testimony."). 
24 See id. at 202 (Many courts hold that "[A] plaintiff can prove specific 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence by providing epidemiological 
evidence that finds a causal relationship with a relative risk greater than 2.0; 
that is, people exposed to the substance suffer injuries at least more than 
twice as frequently as those not exposed."). 
25 See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, Medical 
Monitoring in Missouri After Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.: Sound 
Policy Should Be Restored to a Vague and Unsound Directive, 27 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUBL. L. REV. 135, 148–49 (2007); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical 
Monitoring: The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 369 
(2005). 
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abundance of chemicals to which all Americans are exposed, medical 
monitoring risks opening the floodgates to litigation.26 They warn that 
medical monitoring litigation, coupled with the inherent difficulties of 
managing a medical monitoring program, may unduly and unnecessarily 
burden an already overtaxed judiciary.27 
To address these concerns, some critics have proposed various limiting 
principles that should apply to medical monitoring. Critics urge that lump 
sum awards, which allow successful plaintiffs to do with their money what 
they choose, should be denied entirely.28 Further, they argue courts should 
avoid double recovery in cases where an employer-provided or private 
insurance plan could pay for the necessary monitoring.29 Moreover, critics 
contend plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate that a monitoring 
procedure actually exists which could detect latent injury, that the diagnostics 
and treatment are generally accepted in the medical community, and that 
monitoring beyond general preventative care is warranted given the relative 
risk of developing disease.30 Critics have further posited that the disease for 
which monitoring is sought should be "serious," and there must be 
"demonstrated clinical value in the early detection and diagnosis of the 
disease."31 In other words, if there is no treatment or cure, there can be no 
benefit from detection and diagnosis, thus rendering monitoring 
                                                             
26 Behrens & Appel, supra note 25, at 147, 151–52.  
27 Id. at 144, 149. 
28 Id. at 154–56 (noting that, in some cases, successful claimants have 
not used lump sums awards for medical monitoring); Schwartz et al., supra 
note 25, at 369–71. 
29 Behrens & Appel, supra note 25, at 156. 
30 Id. at 157–58. 
31 Id. at 158. 
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unnecessary.32 Finally, they argue that courts should apply a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine if monitoring is appropriate.33 
Many of these criticisms are well founded, and several courts have 
established criteria similar to those listed above.34 Yet critics often fail to 
acknowledge that defendants who expose the public to toxins are not 
realizing the true costs of the environmental externalities they create.35 
                                                             
32 See id. This argument does not account for advancements in medicine: 
although a disease may be untreatable or incurable at the time of exposure, a 
treatment or cure may later develop, potentially denying persons exposed a 
cure where early diagnosis and treatment could mitigate the disease. 
33 Id. at 159.  
34 See In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 
1990). Some other factors include whether 
(1) the disease in question progressive asymptomatically 
following toxic exposure; (2) a diagnostic test with high 
sensitivity exists; (3) the exposed population has a relatively 
high prevalence of disease; (4) the diagnostic test therefore has 
a high predictive value; (5) the test is relatively low-cost; (6) 
medical monitoring could be integrated into standard clinical 
follow-up of those with disease; (7) monitoring could lead to 
early preventative care; and (8) monitoring allows for the 
appropriate timing of definitive treatment. 
Behrens & Appel, supra note 25, at 159 (citing In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., MDL No. 1203, 2000 WL 1222042 (E.D. Pa. 2000), reh'g denied, 
2000 WL 1599259 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
35 E.g., Richard W. Caperton & Adam Hersh, Putting America Back to 
Work with Clean Energy: Productivity, Economic Efficiency, and the Promise 
of Green Jobs, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/green_jobs.html (noting 
that, though the costs of emissions are not included in utilities' bottom line, 
the public pays for environmental externalities through, for instance, higher 
incidences of disease, lost work days, and premature death). Externalities 
from coal-fired electricity alone cost the United States between $175 and 
$523 billion per year. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle 
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Ultimately, the policy debate depends upon the societal choice of whether to 
place the burden of these costs on the defendants, or on the public as a whole, 
and the corresponding consequences of that choice to economy and health. 
This is a question perhaps better suited for the legislature than the courts. 
However, modern courts have taken on the challenge to a greater or lesser 
degree, creating a varied and interesting body of medical monitoring law in 
just a few decades. 
B. MEDICAL MONITORING IN THE JURISDICTIONAL 
LANDSCAPE 
Medical monitoring is extremely amorphous. Some jurisdictions do not 
recognize it at all.36 Where medical monitoring is recognized, some courts 
impose a fairly uniform set of limits on its availability by requiring plaintiffs 
to prove the significance of the exposure and the necessity of medical 
monitoring.37 Whether medical monitoring is an independent cause of action 
                                                                                                                              
of Coal, 1219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 93 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://solar.gwu.edu/index_files/Resources_files/epstein_full%20cost%20of
%20coal.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2013). See also Michael Martina, Apple 
Criticized for China Supply Chain, REUTERS.COM (Aug. 31, 2011), available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/31/us-apple-china-idUSTRE77U4 
M620110831 (discussing allegations of toxic discharges from suspected 
Apple suppliers, resulting from Apple's effort "grab super profits" by using 
loopholes in developing countries' environmental laws) (last visited Mar. 11, 
2012); Margaret Tortorella, Will the Commerce Clause "Pull the Plug" on 
Minnesota's Quantification of the Environmental Externalities of Electricity 
Production?, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (1995). 
36 See, e.g., Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1041 (D. Neb. 
1999), aff'd 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000). See Martens & Getto, supra note 
13, at 226 (listing jurisdictions refusing to recognize medical monitoring); 
Venugopal, supra note 13, at 1660. 
37 See In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d at 852 (requiring 
plaintiffs alleging a medical monitoring cause of action to prove that: "1. 
Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through 
the negligent actions of the defendant. 2. As a proximate result of exposure, 
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or merely a remedy is sometimes difficult to distinguish, and judicial analysis 
is often unclear.38 In some jurisdictions, medical monitoring resembles an 
independent cause of action, with the anticipated costs of medical monitoring 
as the legally cognizable injury.39 Consequently, in these "cause of action" 
jurisdictions, there need not be present physical injury.40 Other jurisdictions 
refuse to recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action, but allow it as a 
remedy.41 Where framed as a remedy, medical monitoring is most commonly 
                                                                                                                              
plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent 
disease. 3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical 
examinations reasonably necessary. 4. Monitoring and testing procedures 
exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible 
and beneficial. These factors would, of course, be proven by competent 
expert testimony."). In re Paoli has been cited and applied by, e.g., Arch v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 175 F.R.D. 469, 481 (E.D. Penn. 1997), and In re 
Marine Asbestos Cases v. Am. Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 265 F.3d 861, 866 (9th 
Cir. 2001). But see Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001) 
(collecting cases that disagree on the elements required to establish a medical 
monitoring cause of action); Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 
712, 718 (Mo. 2007); Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 312–13 
(N.J. 1987). 
38 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1707–08 (discussing the 
"apparent conflation of right and remedy" by the majority in Metro-North 
Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997)). 
39 See id. at 1702. See, e.g., In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 850–52. But see 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1706 (noting that, to be viable, 
medical monitoring should not be categorized as a claim for purely economic 
loss, because "[n]o jurisdiction recognizes a general duty to take care to avoid 
causing economic loss to others").  
40 See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1476–77 
(D. Colo. 1991); Bougeois v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 359 
(La. 1998); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 977 (Utah 
1993); Petito v. A.H. Robins, 750 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. App. 2000). 
41 See, e.g., Badillo, 16 P.3d at 440 (noting that more cases recognize 
medical monitoring as a remedy than as a cause of action); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 
308, 312. 
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tied to an underlying negligence cause of action;42 the remedy is merely 
"parasitic" on the underlying tort.43 Within these "medical monitoring as 
remedy" jurisdictions, there is a split. Although seemingly antithetical to the 
preventative purpose of medical monitoring, some jurisdictions require 
present physical injury,44 while others do not.45 Because traditional tort law 
provides recovery for future medical expenses, labeling such relief "medical 
monitoring" is a misnomer:46 It is not the "true" medical monitoring at the 
heart of legal debate, and will not be discussed further in this note.47 
The nature of the medical monitoring remedy may be legal or equitable. 
Some jurisdictions categorize medical monitoring as monetary, while others 
                                                             
42 Badillo, 16 P.3d at 440 (citing Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical 
Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance 
Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 671–72 
(1992)). 
43 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1702. See, e.g., Meyer ex rel. 
Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007). 
44 Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991); Witherspoon 
v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 455, 467 (D.D.C. 1997); Wood v. 
Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, 82 S.W.3d 849, 853–54 (Ky. 2002); Hinton ex 
rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 831–32 (Ala. 2001). 
45 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 718; Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 
S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 
P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993). 
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(c) (1979) (stating 
parties tortiously injured are entitled to recover damages for prospective 
"reasonable medical and other expenses"). 
47 See Venugopal, supra note 13, at 1660 n.4 (noting that "states that 
require actual, present injury for recognition of a medical monitoring claim 
do not actually recognize the claim"). 
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categorize it as injunctive.48 The nature of the remedy depends primarily on 
how the plaintiff frames the request for relief. In Day v. NLO, Inc.49 the 
District Court summarized three distinct forms of medical monitoring relief 
and their corresponding remedial categorization: 
First, a court may simply order a defendant to pay a 
plaintiff a certain [lump] sum of money. The plaintiff 
may or may not choose to use that money to have his 
medical condition monitored. Second, a court may order 
the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' medical expenses 
directly so that a plaintiff may be monitored by the 
physician of his choice. Neither of these . . . constitute 
injunctive relief . . . . 
However, a court may also establish an elaborate medical 
monitoring program of its own, managed by court-
appointed court-supervised trustees, pursuant to which a 
plaintiff is monitored by particular physicians and the 
medical data produced utilized for group studies. In this 
situation, a defendant, of course, would finance the program 
as well as being required by the court to address issues as 
they develop during program administration. Under these 
circumstances, the relief constitutes injunctive relief . . . .50 
Courts have framed medical monitoring within each of these structures.51 
However, the lump sum is disfavored and garners severe criticism as 
                                                             
48 Id. at 1660. Compare, e.g., Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 717, with Cook v. 
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512, 515 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding claim 
was not ripe, but noting medical monitoring could be injunctive relief). 
49 Day et al. v. NLO, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 330 (S.D. Ohio 1992), vacated 
sub nom. In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993). 
50 Id. at 335–36. 
51 See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 314–15 (N.J. 1987) 
(affirming a lump-sum jury verdict of $8,204,500 to plaintiffs exposed to 
toxins in well water, but cautioning that policy concerns weigh in favor of 
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ineffective and undermining of the policies in favor of medical monitoring.52 
For example, in Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley,53 a railroad 
employee sought a lump sum for medical monitoring after asbestos exposure, 
but the Supreme Court held that the common law did not support a "full-
blown, traditional, tort law cause of action" for "unqualified" lump sum 
damages awards.54 Thus, this note focuses on claims for either legal or 
equitable relief in the form of a defendant or court-supervised monitoring 
program for toxic exposure.55 
III. MEDICAL MONITORING UNDER RULE 23 AND MISSOURI'S 
FORMULATION IN MEYER 
Toxic exposure can affect a multitude of diverse claimants, some of 
whom may seek medical monitoring in a class action suit. Federal courts 
interpret Rule 23 to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that a proposed class 
satisfies three implied threshold requirements, four express prerequisites, and 
fits within one of four class categories. Many states' procedural rules mimic 
                                                                                                                              
court-supervised programs); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 
271, 284–87 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (certifying class where FDA-approved, 
defendant-supervised monitoring program already in place); Cook, 778 F. 
Supp. at 515. 
52 See Behrens & Appel, supra note 25, at 154–56; Schwartz et al., 
supra note 25, at 369–73. See also Reblitz-Richardson, supra note 18, at 
620–21 (noting the advantages of coordinated medical monitoring programs). 
53 Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
54 Id. at 444. The Court did not fully explain which qualifications, if any, 
would render lump sum awards acceptable, and remanded the case, seemingly 
implying that the plaintiff could replead for non-lump sum relief. See id. at 
455–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
55 Medical monitoring is also relevant to products (especially 
pharmaceutical) liability; the author limits this discussion to toxins primarily 
because of developments in Missouri's medical monitoring law. See Part 
III.C. 
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,56 and except for minor variations, 
Missouri's Rule 52.08 is virtually identical to Rule 23.57 
The preliminary showing plaintiffs must make to certify a class under 
Rule 23 or state rules may act as barriers to medical monitoring class action 
suits. This Part discusses Rule 23, the general operation of medical 
monitoring within class action rules, and Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 
Missouri's first medical monitoring class action. 
A. CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 23 
Courts apply a "rigorous analysis" to Rule 23. If any element is 
unsatisfied, the class may not be certified.58 Courts have articulated three 
threshold requirements into Rule 23: 1) the class must be definable; 2) the 
representative must be a class member; and 3) the controversy must be live, 
not moot.59 Once these thresholds are met, the proposed class must then 
satisfy four prerequisites under Rule 23(a): 1) the class must have 
"numerosity," such that joinder is impracticable; 2) the legal or factual 
questions must have "commonality"; 3) the claims or defenses of the class 
representatives must show "typicality" of those of the class; and 4) the class 
representatives and counsel must "fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class."60 Thus, Rule 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) focus on judicial economy and 
                                                             
56 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 877, 922 n.181 (2011) (discussing virtual "in toto" adoption of the 
Federal Rules by many state courts, and noting that "the basic vision of the 
Federal Rules . . . has exercised an influence even on those states that did not 
adopt the Rules"). 
57 Compare MO. SUP. CT. R. 52.08, with FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
58 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
59 KLONOFF ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY 
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (3d ed. 2012). 
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
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the class as a whole, while (a)(3) and (a)(4) focus on the class representatives, 
counsel and due process for unnamed class members.61 
After satisfying the four prerequisites, the proposed class must fit within 
one of four categories in Rule 23(b). First, (b)(1)(A) allows certification if 
individual litigation would risk inconsistent judgments, resulting in 
"incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class."62 
Second, (b)(1)(B) allows certification if individual litigation would prevent 
proposed class members not party to the litigation from pursuing, or 
adequately protecting, their interests.63 Third, (b)(2) allows certification 
where the class opponent "acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate" for the whole class.64 Subdivision (b)(2) was established 
with a goal of opening the door to civil rights class actions and expressly 
excludes claims for purely monetary relief.65 Yet, a (b)(2) class may still be 
certified if monetary claims are merely incidental to claims for injunctive or 
declaratory relief.66 Also, some courts imply a "cohesiveness" requirement on 
                                                             
61 See KLONOFF ET AL., supra note 59, at 61. 
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). This circumstance may arise when 
two individuals seek varying injunctive relief, making it impossible for the 
defendant to comply with both judgments. 
63 Id. at 23(b)(1)(B). This situation often arises in "limited fund" 
lawsuits, where a large judgment against the defendant would leave it 
insolvent, thus precluding late-coming plaintiffs from relief. KLONOFF ET AL., 
supra note 59, at 171. See Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 227; Allison v. 
Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
65 See KLONOFF ET AL., supra note 59, at 191 (noting that "[t]he drafters 
[of (b)(2)] envisioned that the subdivision would be used heavily in civil 
rights cases"); Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 227. 
66 See Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 227; Allison, 151 F.3d at 415. 
But see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011) 
(holding backpay claims were not "incidental" to injunctive relief, and 
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putative (b)(2) classes.67 Fourth, a class may be certified under Section (b)(3) 
if common issues "predominate" over individual issues, and a class action is 
"superior" to other adjudicative mechanisms.68 Section (b)(3) provides four 
factors for assessing predominance and superiority, with an emphasis on 
judicial economy.69 Section (b)(3) allows for monetary relief; so to ensure 
due process, Rule 23(c) requires unnamed class members to receive notice 
and a chance to "opt out" of the class, in order to avoid preclusion of their 
individual money damages claims.70 As Rule 23(c) does not provide a similar 
opt-out procedure for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, they are "mandatory," and 
individual claimants cannot generally escape class membership.71 
B. MEDICAL MONITORING AND CLASS CERTIFICATION 
GENERALLY 
Medical monitoring claims are often brought as class actions, 
particularly in toxic exposure cases.72 These claims are often removed to 
federal courts under federal diversity jurisdiction in part because of the nature 
                                                                                                                              
expressing reservation whether any types of monetary relief could be 
"incidental" to injunctive or declaratory relief). 
67 See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 
1998) (stating that the "cohesiveness" inquiry may be more restrictive than 
predominance under (b)(3)). But see Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 
(9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting cohesiveness).  
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
69 Id. at 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). These factors include the proposed class 
members' interests in individual litigation, the existence of ongoing litigation, 
the desirability of the particular forum, and the manageability of the proposed 
class. 
70 See Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 227. 
71 Id. 
72 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1703. 
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of the parties in toxic exposure cases,73 and in part because the Class Action 
Fairness Act74 significantly federalized class actions in 2005.75 However, 
"case law regarding the appropriateness of class treatment in pollution cases 
is 'sparse and divided.'"76 Although several courts and commentators have 
posited that medical monitoring claims are "ideally situated" for class 
treatment because diagnostics and examinations are "essentially 
standardized,"77 some courts are more skeptical. These courts have denied 
certification under Rule 23(b).78 The extraordinarily complex individual 
causation issues in toxic exposure cases can preclude certification particularly 
because the "rigorous analysis" required for class certification "will entail 
                                                             
73 Although some toxics cases involve geographically-limited 
contamination as in Meyer, many implicate diversity jurisdiction because of 
out-of-state defendant-manufacturers or nationwide distribution, as with 
asbestos or tobacco. See, e.g., Barnes, 161 F.3d at 130–31 (suit by 
Pennsylvania residents against all "the major American tobacco companies," 
initially filed in Pennsylvania court and removed to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania by defendants on grounds of diversity of citizenship. Id. at 
138). 
74 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006). 
75 The Act federalized class actions primarily by expanding federal 
district courts' original jurisdiction over class and "mass" actions, and 
liberalizing removal from state to federal court. See KLONOFF ET AL., supra 
note 59, at 467–70. 
76 Reblitz-Richardson, supra note 18, at 623 (quoting Mejdrech v. Met-
Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 910 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
77 E.g., Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 272 (noting at least 15 
federal and 11 state cases have adopted similar reasoning and quoting Patrick 
J. Hagan, Medical Monitoring: Will Buckley Have an Effect?, 17 FED'N OF 
INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 225 (1998)). 
78 Id. See, e.g., Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 
F.R.D. 90, 94 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (where neither commonality nor 
predominance satisfied for tobacco injuries); Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 
Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1400, 1403–04 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (finding that 
predominance was not met for TCE contamination). 
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some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim."79 
Certification has been denied under both the implied "cohesiveness" 
requirement of (b)(2) classes,80 as well as the "predominance" inquiry for 
(b)(3) classes.81  
Additionally, at least until Dukes, the tripartite recovery regime 
described in Day had obvious implications for class certification. Under the 
first and second Day categories, where plaintiffs request lump sums or 
defendant-supervised programs, the proposed class might be certified under 
(b)(3).82 Under the third Day category, where plaintiffs seek an injunctive 
court-supervised program, the proposed class might be certified under 
                                                             
79 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (citing 
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982)). Merits inquiry 
into class status can frontload discovery, raising issues of expert witness 
admissibility and other evidentiary battles. See Rebecca Justice Lazarus, 
Discovery Prior to Class Certification: New Considerations and Challenges, 
MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORT: CLASS ACTIONS 6 (Jan. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Lazarus-
DiscoveryPriorToClassCertification.pdf. 
80 See Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 273 (citing Philip Morris, Inc. 
v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 253 (Md. 2000) for the proposition that the 
"cohesiveness" requirement is "even more demanding and difficult to satisfy" 
than the (b)(3) predominance inquiry. Id.). But see Venugopal, supra note 13, 
at 1681–94 (arguing a stringent cohesiveness requirement is unnecessary for 
most medical monitoring claims). 
81 See, e.g., Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 
(1997). 
82 See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 314–15 (N.J. 1987) 
(lump sum), In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., Accufix Atrial "J" Leads 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 172 F.R.D. 271, 284–87 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (certifying a 
defendant-supervised program under (b)(1)(A), and stating the class also met 
(b)(3), and possibly (b)(1)(B), but not (b)(2)). 
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(b)(2).83 Similarly, a proposed class might be certified under (b)(1)(A), when, 
for example, multiple plaintiffs bring individual claims seeking inconsistent 
medical monitoring programs, thus placing the defendant at risk of 
incompatible standards.84 Finally, although (b)(1)(B) would seem to be 
available when there are a large number of plaintiffs and the medical 
monitoring would be costly, creating a potential "limited fund,"85 recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has restricted this avenue.86  
C. THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT'S FORMULATION OF 
MEDICAL MONITORING IN MEYER 
The Missouri Supreme Court adopted medical monitoring in Meyer ex 
rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.87 in 2007. In Meyer, the defendants were involved 
                                                             
83 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (allowing certification where "final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as 
a whole"). 
84 See, e.g., In re Telectronics at 284–85 (certifying products liability 
medical monitoring class under (b)(1)(A) where over 400 individual suits 
were pending in multi-district litigation, risking "multiple and conflicting 
orders rendered from different courts regarding the scope and necessity of a 
medical monitoring program which may also conflict with FDA imposed 
requirements."). But see O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 359, 
377 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying certification of a proposed (b)(1)(A) class 
seeking monitoring for nuclear exposure, distinguishing that, in In re 
Telectronics, medical monitoring was a cause of action instead of a remedy, 
and the defendant had created its own monitoring program so that any court 
order would affect the whole class). 
85 The "limited fund" is particularly relevant where many plaintiffs 
suffer present physical injury in addition to those at risk of latent, future 
injury, creating a risk of inadequate representation by named plaintiffs or 
class counsel whose interests in representing one group may inherently 
conflict with the other group. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625–27. 
86 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 850–61 (1999).  
87 Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. 2007). 
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in operating a lead smelter in Herculaneum, Missouri.88 The smelter annually 
emitted large quantities of lead and other chemical by-products, thereby 
increasing the risk of lead and toxin related medical problems, which are 
especially harmful to children.89 The plaintiff proposed a (b)(3) class of over 
200 children,90 alleging negligence, strict liability, private nuisance, and 
trespass as theories of liability. As to recovery, the plaintiff sought 
compensatory damages to establish a medical monitoring program for 
ongoing diagnostic testing to detect lead and other toxin related injuries or 
illnesses.91 
Meyer reached the Missouri Supreme Court after the District Court held, 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the proposed class could not be 
certified because individual issues would predominate over common issues.92 
On appeal, the plaintiff alleged the Court of Appeals erred because "its class 
                                                             
88 Id. at 714. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. The proposed class included all minors who lived in, or attended 
school or day care in, the "Class Geographic Area" for at least 12 months 
while under 6 years of age, and all minors born to mothers who lived in the 
Area for more than seven months of pregnancy, with eligibility capped at 168 
months (14 years) of age.  
91 Id. The plaintiffs sought medical monitoring even though, at the time 
the suit was filed, persons in the Herculaneum area could avail themselves of 
free blood testing to screen for lead. Meyer ex rel. v. Fluor Corp., 2006 WL 
996540, at 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) ("Meyer I"). Although blood testing can 
quantify the amount of lead in the bloodstream, it does not reveal lead stored 
in tissues and other organs. See, e.g., OSHA, Substance Data Sheet for 
Occupational Exposure to Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 App. A(ii.)(B)(3) 
(2012). 
92 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 714. Interestingly, although the trial court 
found the class satisfied numerosity, neither the trial court nor the Court of 
Appeals ruled on commonality or typicality, thus skipping two 23(a) elements 
typically viewed as prerequisites to the 23(b) analysis. See Meyer I, 2006 WL 
at 1; Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 719–20. 
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action analysis assumed incorrectly that a present physical injury is a 
necessary element of a medical monitoring claim," and the individualized 
issues the court addressed were relevant to personal injury actions, but not 
medical monitoring for class-wide toxic exposure to future injury.93 The 
Court of Appeals purported to assume, without deciding, that a medical 
monitoring claim could proceed without present physical injury, yet it held 
otherwise.94 In affirming the trial court's denial of class certification for lack 
of predominance, the Court of Appeals expressed its overriding concern that 
certifying a medical monitoring class without requiring present physical 
injury would prove too much, allowing generic causation to be determined 
without regard to the individual connection between causation and 
exposure.95 The Court of Appeals identified nine individual issues96 and 
determined that the "evidence would perforce need to be individual rather 
than common."97  
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that "'well-
accepted' principles of Missouri law entitle plaintiffs to recover for the 
prospective consequences of a defendant's tortious conduct if the injury is 
                                                             
93 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 715. 
94 Meyer I, 2006 WL at 4–5. The plaintiff also alleged "actual injury" 
from the smelter's by-products. Id. at 1. 
95 Id. at 6. 
96 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 719 (quoting Meyer I at 1). The issues the 
Court of Appeals identified included: 
the age at which exposure occurred, the nature of the exposure, 
the time period over which the exposure occurred, the blood 
lead level, the existence of other sources such as lead paint for 
any presence of lead, whether the individuals are presently 
suffering from any lead related injuries, whether the 
individuals are still being exposed or whether such exposure 
terminated, if the exposure to lead in Herculaneum has 
terminated how long ago it terminated, and whether there is 
any need for a particular individual to be monitored. 
97 Meyer I, 2006 WL at 4. 
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reasonably certain to occur."98 Guided by these principles, the Court 
determined that medical monitoring is not a new tort, but is "simply a 
compensable item of damage when liability is established under traditional 
tort theories of recovery."99 Thus, under this formulation, medical monitoring 
in Missouri is not a cause of action, but a remedy "parasitic" on an underlying 
tort claim, and the remedy is monetary, not equitable.100 However, the Court 
stated, "the theory of recovery for medical monitoring damages is that the 
plaintiff is entitled, upon proper proof, to obtain compensation for an injury 
to the legally protected interest in avoiding the cost of reasonably necessary 
medical monitoring occasioned by the defendant's actions."101 This statement 
seems to conflict with the Court's notion that medical monitoring is a 
"parasitic" remedy, and instead resembles those jurisdictions where medical 
monitoring is an independent cause of action with economic injury as the 
legally cognizable harm.102 
Given its formulation of medical monitoring, the Court held that no 
present injury was required because "a physical injury requirement essentially 
extinguishes the claim and bars the plaintiff from a full recovery."103 Thus, 
the Court of Appeals erred by applying factors "primarily relevant to a 
                                                             
98 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 717. 
99 Id. 
100 The Court of Appeals specifically noted that the plaintiffs sought 
monetary damages, "but not equitable relief." Meyer I, 2006 WL at 1. This is 
despite the fact that the plaintiffs sought to establish a medical monitoring 
program, Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 714, and as elaborated in Day, the program 
can either be injunctive or monetary, depending on whether it is court- or 
defendant-supervised. Day v. NLO, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 330, 335–36 (S.D. Ohio 
1992).  
101 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 718 (citing Bower v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 429–30 (W. Va. 1999)). 
102 See discussion at Part V.A. (This economic injury basis for medical 
monitoring is problematic, as it conflicts with the economic loss rule.) 
103 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 718. 
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personal injury action."104 The Court then established a two-part test for 
analyzing predominance: first, a plaintiff must show "a significantly 
increased risk" of exposure-related disease, and second, that the "medical 
monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary" for 
detection and diagnosis of the disease.105 Because the "common and 
overriding issue" in Meyer was "the common exposure to a set of toxins from 
a single source," the Court held the plaintiffs had satisfied the predominance 
requirement.106 
The only court to analyze a medical monitoring claim in Missouri post-
Meyer strictly construed its holding. In Ratliff v. Mentor Corp.,107 a products 
liability case, a federal district court held that, because Meyer was the only 
Missouri case addressing medical monitoring, and because "[f]ederal courts 
should not expand liability in diversity cases if the legal theory is 'not well 
established,'" Meyer only allowed medical monitoring in toxic exposure 
cases.108 In Ratliff, as in Meyer, the named plaintiff alleged several 
underlying tort causes of action and sought medical monitoring as a remedy 
for the increased risk of "vaginal mesh" injuries from a product implanted in 
the pelvis to treat urinary stress incontinence.109 As the issue was a defective 
                                                             
104 Id. at 719. 
105 Id. at 718 (citing Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433, 431). 
106 Id. at 719. 
107 Ratliff v. Mentor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d 926 (W.D. Mo. 2008). 
108 Id. at 929 (quoting Tucker v. Paxcon Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 624 
(9th Cir. 1981)). 
109 Id. at 927–28. The plaintiff's primary tort theory was products 
liability. Interestingly, neither plaintiff nor the court categorized the medical 
monitoring remedy as damages; rather, the plaintiff sought "medical 
monitoring as an equitable remedy" and a declaratory judgment, and 
requested the court to "invoke equity to set up a notification, research, and 
medical monitoring fund. . . ." Id. at 928. 
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product instead of toxic exposure, the court dismissed with prejudice the 
medical monitoring claim.110 
IV. THE DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF WAL-MART V. DUKES ON RULE 23 
ANALYSIS 
In states like Missouri, medical monitoring is an important tool for 
plaintiffs who could not otherwise afford the diagnostics necessary to detect 
latent diseases caused by toxic exposure. Yet because many toxic exposures 
are mass torts, putative classes, which could be certified under state law, they 
may be decided in federal courts applying Rule 23. In Dukes, the majority of 
the Supreme Court conflated the previously "easily satisfied" commonality 
analysis under Rule 23(a)(2) with the more demanding "predominance" 
inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) and applied a strict injunctive standard for (b)(2) 
classes. Part IV explains the Supreme Court's Rule 23 analysis in Dukes. 
Further, it briefly describes a recent Third Circuit case that denied 
certification for a putative medical monitoring class and relied in part on 
Dukes' holdings in the context of both (b)(2) and (b)(3). Finally, this Part 
provides an analysis of the likely downstream effects of Dukes on medical 
monitoring class actions generally, emphasizing the effects for Missouri. 
A. WAL-MART V. DUKES: MUDDYING THE WATERS OF RULE 
23 ANALYSIS 
In a 2011 watershed decision, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,111 a massive employment discrimination 
class action case.112 The proposed class sought certification under Rule 
23(b)(2) and requested injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as punitive 
                                                             
110 Ratliff, 569 F. Supp. 2d at 929.  
111 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
112 Id. at 2547. The putative class included 1.5 million current and 
former Wal-Mart employees alleging sex discrimination regarding denial of 
equal pay or promotions. 
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damages and back-pay.113 The Supreme Court held 5-4 that the putative class 
failed to satisfy the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2)114 and 
unanimously held that the class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).115  
As a preliminary matter, the majority stated that Rule 23 is not "a mere 
pleading standard."116 Rather, satisfaction of the Rule's provisions is a factual 
matter to be determined under a "rigorous analysis" that frequently "entail[s] 
some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim."117 In its 
Rule 23(a)(2) analysis, the majority declared that "commonality requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members 'have suffered the same 
injury,'" and not merely a violation of the same law.118 The majority further 
declared that the class members' claims "must depend upon a common 
contention" that "must be of such a nature that it is capable of class wide 
resolution, which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve 
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 
stroke."119 As the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a "biased testing procedure," 
or "significant proof" of a general policy of discrimination, the majority 
found commonality lacking.120 
                                                             
113 Id. at 2548. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's certification 
of the class, reasoning that individual backpay issues did not predominate 
over the request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 2550. 
114 Id. at 2556–57. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 2551–52 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982)). 
117 Id. 
118 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157). 
119 Id. (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
120 Id. at 2553–56 (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157–58, 159 n.15).  
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According to the dissent's argument, the majority's holding is discordant 
with the plain text of Rule 23(a)(2), which merely requires that the class as a 
whole have at least one question of law or fact in common.121 The majority's 
holding essentially conflated the commonality prerequisite with the more 
rigorous predominance inquiry under (b)(3), thereby "elevat[ing] the (a)(2) 
inquiry so that it is no longer 'easily satisfied,'" as it should be.122 By 
mimicking the predominance inquiry of subdivision Rule 23(b)(3) in its 
(b)(2) analysis, the majority left "no mission" for Rule 23(b)(3), which was 
designed to test "whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to 
warrant adjudication by representation."123 Particularly concerning is the 
possibility that the stricter evaluation meant for (b)(3) classes may now tacitly 
                                                             
121 Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, wrote that "[t]he Rule 'does not require 
that all questions of law or fact raised in the litigation be common," id. at 
2562 (quoting 1 H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 3.10, 348–49 (3d ed. 1992)), and "indeed, '[e]ven a single question of law 
or fact common to the members of the class will satisfy the commonality 
requirement,'" so long as it "will advance the determination of the class 
members' claims." (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle 
and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 176 n.110 
(2003)). Under the dissent's approach, the plaintiffs satisfied commonality, 
because resolution of their claims "would necessitate examination of 
particular policies and practices alleged to affect, adversely and globally, 
women employed at Wal-Mart's stores," and "Rule 23(a)(2), setting a 
necessary but not a sufficient criterion for class-certification, demands 
nothing further." Dukes at 2565. 
122 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 (citing 5 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.23[2] (3d ed. 2011)). Robert H. Klonoff, The 
Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038985. 
123 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)). 
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apply to (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes under the majority's commonality analysis 
as the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) apply to all (b) classes.124 
Despite the majority's conflated commonality analysis, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that the proposed class could not be certified under 
Rule 23(b)(2).125 As a foundational matter, the Court emphasized the 
importance of the notice and opt-out provisions of Rule 23(b)(3) to due 
process when the relief sought is monetary instead of declaratory or 
injunctive.126 The Court then dispensed with three different theories regarding 
the relationship between the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and 
back-pay. First, the Court found it irrelevant that the back-pay claims were 
not the "predominating request." The Court gave no weight to the Advisory 
Committee's statement that subdivision (b)(2) "does not extend to cases in 
which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to 
money damages,"127 and refused to allow (b)(2) certification where monetary 
claims are simply non-predominant or non-exclusive.128 Second, the Court 
held that regardless of whether the claims to back-pay were "equitable" in 
nature, "[t]he Rule does not speak of 'equitable' remedies generally but of 
                                                             
124 Id. The dissent emphasized that, so long as Rule 23(a) is satisfied for 
(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, "[g]eneralizations concerning such individually 
applicable evidence cannot serve as a justification for the denial of 
[injunctive] relief." Id. at 2567. This sentiment is likely driven by concern for 
civil rights claimants. See KLONOFF ET AL., supra note 59, at 191. 
125 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
126 Id. at 2559. 
127 Id. (citing Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966)) 
(emphasis in opinion). 
128 Id. at 2559–60. The Court was concerned that the plaintiffs' 
"predominance" test may entirely preclude individual class members with 
backpay claims from recovery by collateral estoppel if the class failed on the 
merits. Id. at 2559. 
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injunctions and declaratory judgments."129 Third, although the plaintiffs did 
not argue that back-pay was "incidental," the Court acknowledged that some 
courts have granted (b)(2) certification where monetary claims are merely 
"incidental" to declaratory or injunctive claims.130 Although the Court did not 
decide whether any forms of "incidental" monetary relief are consistent with 
(b)(2) and due process, it held that the plaintiffs' back-pay claims could not 
satisfy the "incidental" standard in any case.131 
B. GATES V. ROHM & HAAS CO.: APPLYING DUKES TO 
MEDICAL MONITORING 
In 2011, only a month after Dukes, the Third Circuit decided Gates v. 
Rohm & Haas Co.,132 a case involving alleged contamination of air and 
drinking water by vinyl chloride, a carcinogen.133 The plaintiffs sought 
certification of a proposed medical monitoring class under both (b)(2) and 
(b)(3).134 The Third Circuit reserved the decision on whether monetary 
aspects of medical monitoring were "incidental" to injunctive relief under 
                                                             
129 Id. at 2560. The Court also noted that Title VII, the anti-
discrimination statute at issue, distinguished between backpay and 
declaratory and injunctive relief (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(g)(2) (2006)).  
130 Id. (citing Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th 
Cir. 1998), in which the Fifth Circuit defined "incidental" monetary relief as 
"damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the 
claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief," and stated 
that "incidental damage should not require additional hearings to resolve the 
disparate merits of each individual's case; it should neither introduce new 
substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail complex individualized 
determinations"). 
131 Dukes, 131 S. Ct at 2560. 
132 Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2011). 
133 Id. at 258. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of CERCLA. Id. at 
259. 
134 Id. at 262.  
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Rule 23(b)(2).135 However, it declared that "a (b)(2) class may require more 
cohesiveness than a (b)(3) class," and "[b]ecause causation and medical 
necessity often require individual proof, medical monitoring classes may 
founder for lack of cohesion."136 Citing Dukes for the proposition that the 
"rigorous" class certification analysis often overlaps with the merits and 
(b)(2) classes must have "strong commonality of interests," the Third Circuit 
upheld the district court's merits review of expert testimony on exposure.137 
The plaintiffs presented expert testimony averaging the exposure across the 
class to demonstrate that monitoring was "reasonably medically necessary," 
but the Third Circuit emphasized that "evidence of hypothetical, composite 
persons" was insufficient for establishing cohesion.138 Since the average 
exposure evidence was insufficient, and because the proposed monitoring 
could be harmful to certain class members,139 the Third Circuit determined 
                                                             
135 Id. at 263 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2557, 2561 (2011)). 
136 Id. at 264 (citing Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142 (3d 
Cir. 1998), and citing, among other cases, In re St. Jude Med. Inc., 425 F.3d 
1116, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
137 Id. at 264–65. This was despite the parties' stipulation that Daubert 
issues for expert witness testimony would not be addressed at the class 
certification stage. Id. at 265. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993). 
138 Gates, 655 F.3d at 266–68. The Third Circuit emphasized that 
averaged exposure evidence does "not reflect that different persons may have 
different levels of exposure based on biological factors or individual activities 
over the class period," citing activity level, age, sex, genetics, work, travel, 
and recreational habits, id. at 267, and rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion to 
base the relevant exposure level on EPA's regulatory thresholds because 
"[a]lthough the positions of regulatory policymakers are relevant, their risk 
assessments are not necessarily conclusive in determining what risk exposure 
presents to specified individuals." Id. at 268 (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, supra note 22, at 413). 
139 Id. at 268–69 (the evidence indicated MRI monitoring could be 
harmful to those with pre-existing kidney disease). 
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that a class-wide remedy could not be granted. 140 In the Third Circuit's view, 
individual proceedings would be required to assess the class members' 
medical histories and the "benefits and safety of a monitoring program."141  
Regarding Rule 23(b)(3), the Third Circuit asserted that the 
predominance and superiority requirements of (b)(3) "are less stringent than 
the cohesiveness requirement of Rule 23(b)(2),"142 but rejected the plaintiffs' 
attempts to redefine an alternative (b)(3) class with more specific, yearly 
exposure evidence.143 In denying (b)(3) certification, the Third Circuit cited 
Dukes' command that Rule 23 is not "a mere pleading standard," and a 
plaintiff must "affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that 
is he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous 
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc."144 
C. THE LIKELY DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF DUKES ON 
MEDICAL MONITORING GENERALLY 
As Gates demonstrates, proposed medical monitoring classes may 
quickly feel the effects of Dukes' heightened scrutiny without a change in 
law. Although there are limitations on the effect of federal procedural rules 
on state substantive law,145 and states are not bound by federal procedural 
                                                             
140 Id. at 269. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. (citing Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 and In re St. Jude, 425 F.3d at 
1121). 
143 Id. at 270. 
144 Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 
(2011)). 
145 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 
S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) (discussing limitations imposed by Erie and the 
Rules Enabling Act); discussion infra Part V.C. 
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rules, Rule 23 applies to state class actions in federal courts.146 In cases like 
Meyer, where an in-state defendant causes relatively isolated toxic exposure, 
local plaintiffs can likely avoid federal diversity jurisdiction and increase the 
chances of surviving the class certification inquiry. Yet toxic exposure is 
often a mass tort involving toxins like asbestos, with nationwide distribution 
and out-of-state defendants that will likely seek federal diversity 
jurisdiction,147 thereby likely implicating the new strictures on Rule 23 
certification imposed by Dukes. 
The consequences of Dukes for medical monitoring claims are 
undeniable. As a prerequisite of Rule 23(a), and as the dissenting Justices in 
Dukes feared, Dukes' commonality analysis is not easily avoided and may be 
interpreted to apply to all 23(b) classes.148 As a general matter, Dukes' call for 
merits inquiry to determine if Rule 23's requirements are met and may force 
medical monitoring plaintiffs to demonstrate at the class certification stage 
complicated evidence regarding individual exposure, relative risk, and 
general and specific causation in order to satisfy commonality, thereby 
compounding the difficulties of proof relating to admissibility of expert 
testimony.149 This frontloaded discovery is a costly and time-intensive 
                                                             
146 See id. at 1437–38.  
147 As of 2001, mass tort actions were "increasingly brought in state 
courts." Mark C. Weber, Forum Allocation in Toxic Tort Cases: Lessons from 
the Tobacco Litigation and Other Recent Developments, 26 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 93 (2001). See also Stephen J. Carroll et al., 
Asbestos Litigation, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 61 (2005), 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162 
.pdf. However, the federalization of class actions has greatly increased since 
2005. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
148 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565. 
149 See Lazarus, supra note 79, at 6.  
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impediment to certifying any medical monitoring class.150 Further, what is 
merely an impediment to the proposed class could prove an insurmountable 
barrier to individual litigants, leaving plaintiffs tortiously exposed to toxins 
with no effective recovery for costly diagnostics to detect and treat latent 
disease.151  
On the other hand, Dukes may not prove to be entirely the watershed 
case it initially appears to be. Under Rule 23(b)(2), it is possible that federal 
courts will carve out exceptions to Dukes' limitation on individual monetary 
claims "incidental" to injunctive relief, isolating that restriction to 
employment discrimination cases seeking individual back-pay claims.152 
Even if Dukes' strict injunctive standard is not construed as limited to 
employment cases, it will likely have little effect where medical monitoring is 
deemed injunctive. Yet it will still be relevant where, as in Meyer, the 
                                                             
150 See, e.g., Carroll et al., supra note 147, at xxvi (noting that, of $70 
billion spent in asbestos litigation from the 1960s through 2002, claimants 
had transaction costs of $19 billion). 
151 Blue collar workers and low-income communities are 
disproportionately affected by toxins, and less able to pay for the intensive 
discovery required in individual toxic tort litigation, or the necessary costs of 
independent monitoring. The availability of a class remedy for medical 
monitoring is thus especially important to social justice. See generally Robert 
D. Bullard et al., Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty: Why Race Still Matters 
After All of These Years, 38 ENVTL. L. 371 (2008) (noting that, despite the 
1987 publication of the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial 
Justice's landmark report, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States, which 
brought to light the problem of environmental injustice toward communities 
of color, "people of color and low-income communities are still the dumping 
grounds for all kinds of toxins." Id. at 372.). See also Elizabeth B. Forsyth, 
Solving Widespread Toxic Chemical Exposure: A Taxing Job, 29 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 115, 120 & n.41 (2011). 
152 See Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court's Recent Class Action 
Jurisprudence: Gazing into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015 
(discussing cases distinguishing Dukes' (b)(2) analysis). 
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plaintiff frames the request for relief as monetary.153 Also, under Rule 
23(b)(3), it is possible that federal courts applying Dukes' commonality 
analysis will in turn heighten their scrutiny of predominance in order to avoid 
leaving the requirement with "no mission."154 However, it is more likely that 
putative (b)(3) medical monitoring classes will simply face the same hurdles 
they have historically, but just at an earlier time in the proceedings.155 
V. CORRECTING FOR DUKES: LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND JUDICIAL 
AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
Given Dukes' heightened scrutiny of Rule 23(a)(2) and (b)(2), and the 
likelihood that federal courts will be the ultimate adjudicators of state medical 
monitoring claims, Missouri may wish to reconsider and revise medical 
monitoring to buttress its citizens' chances of recovery. Part V discusses 
various approaches Missouri courts, litigants, and legislators should consider. 
First, the courts should reaffirm existing interpretations of predominance and 
commonality, and clarify the limits of medical monitoring. Second, where 
medical monitoring is a remedy, as in Missouri, litigants should frame their 
request for relief as injunctive rather than monetary and avoid vague 
"equitable" language. Litigants should also consider framing medical 
monitoring as an independent cause of action rather than a "parasitic" 
remedy. Third, the legislature should consider framing medical monitoring as 
a "substantive" right. 
                                                             
153 If, for example, the plaintiffs in Meyer sought to enjoin the lead 
smelter's operations, and also sought damages in the form of medical 
monitoring, the reviewing court may have to determine if the monitoring was 
sufficiently "incidental" to the injunctive relief to satisfy (b)(2). 
154 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2566 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
155 Klonoff, supra note 122. 
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A. MISSOURI COURTS SHOULD REAFFIRM EXISTING 
INTERPRETATIONS OF RULE 52.08 AND CLARIFY THE LIMITS 
AND THEORY OF RECOVERY FOR MEDICAL MONITORING 
Despite similarities between state class action rules and Rule 23, state 
and federal courts may apply different interpretations. For example, some 
federal courts may take an all-or-nothing approach to the predominance 
inquiry in Rule 23 so a single individualized issue may prevent certification. 
To the contrary, states may take an "all-things-considered, balancing inquiry," 
where a single common issue may outweigh many individual questions.156 
Likewise, in Missouri "[t]he predominant issue need not be 'dispositive of the 
controversy or even be determinative of the liability issues involved.'"157 This 
proposition contradicts Dukes' imperative that, for commonality, which 
should arguably be a lower bar than predominance, determination of a 
common issue must "resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one 
of the claims in one stroke."158  
Given the tensions between the federal and state class action inquiry, 
and the gaps left by the Meyer court, Missouri courts should take several 
steps to strike a balanced approach to medical monitoring. To protect 
                                                             
156 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2378 (2011) (distinguishing 
the federal approach to 23(b)(3) from West Virginia's interpretation of 
predominance in In re Rezulin Litigation, 585 S.E.2d 52, 72 (W. Va. 2003)); 
see also Klonoff, supra note 122 (noting that federal courts in recent years 
have denied certification on predominance after finding individual issues 
"without carefully weighing those individualized issues against the common 
issues.") (emphasis in original); Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 
S.W.3d 712, 715–16 (Mo. 2007) (describing Missouri's predominance inquiry 
as allowing class certification where one or more common issues 
predominate, "even though other important matters will have to be tried 
separately"). 
157 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 (quoting ALBA CONTE & HERBERT 
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:25, at 269 (4th ed. 2002)). 
158 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
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plaintiffs in state court from defendants' likely arguments that Dukes' analysis 
should apply to Rule 52.08, Missouri's version of Rule 23, Missouri courts 
should reaffirm existing state law precedent for both commonality and 
predominance. Further, Missouri courts should affirmatively declare that 
Meyer was not limited to toxic exposure, as the federal district court in Ratliff 
presumed, but also applies to products.159 On the other hand, to protect 
defendants from unfairly shouldering the burden of medical monitoring for 
plaintiffs who may never manifest injury, Missouri courts should go beyond 
the two-part test in Meyer, which requires a plaintiff to show "significantly 
increased risk" of disease and that monitoring is "to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, necessary."160 In addition to these fundamental elements, 
the courts should impose some of the limits proposed by critics of medical 
monitoring and adopted in other jurisdictions, such as requiring that the 
treatments and diagnostics are generally accepted in the medical 
community.161  
Moreover, Meyer arguably mischaracterized the legally cognizable harm 
as injury to the plaintiffs' economic interests.162 This theory of recovery for 
medical monitoring is fundamentally at odds with the "economic loss rule," 
                                                             
159 See discussion supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. Products 
liability is even more appropriate for medical monitoring because many 
causal issues are avoided. All claimants have been exposed to the same 
product which is known to have a particular defect. 
160 Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Mo. 
2007). 
161 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
162 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 718 (stating that the theory of recovery for 
medical monitoring is that "the plaintiff is entitled, upon proper proof, to 
obtain compensation for an injury to the legally protected interest in avoiding 
the cost of reasonably necessary medical monitoring occasioned by the 
defendant's actions.") (emphasis added). 
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which states that a defendant has no duty or liability for purely economic loss 
without corresponding physical damage.163  
The Missouri Supreme Court is not alone in conflating the remedy of 
recovering the costs of medical monitoring with the right to recover due to a 
defendant's tortious conduct.164 If Missouri courts continue characterizing 
medical monitoring as a remedy "parasitic" on an underlying tort, they should 
avoid describing the harm as economic in the future. A better approach is to 
elevate medical monitoring from a mere remedy to an independent cause of 
action based on an affirmative duty on the part of toxin manufacturers and 
distributors. Although tort law is generally reluctant to recognize affirmative 
duties,165 toxic exposure is a prime area for an exception. Claims for medical 
monitoring should be no different than claims against defendants who have 
created a dangerous condition, giving rise to a corresponding duty to those 
harmed.166 Manufacturers, distributors, and handlers of toxins who 
negligently create a danger of toxic exposure owe a corresponding duty to 
those they expose. Cast in this light, requiring defendants in toxic exposure 
cases to pay for the costs of medical monitoring merely "enjoin[s] 
performance of a primary duty rather than seeking compensation for a 
                                                             
163 See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1707. 
164 Variation in whether medical monitoring is a remedy or a cause of 
action can be attributed to confusion in even the highest courts. See id. at 
1707–08 (discussing the Supreme Court's "conflation of right and remedy" in 
its determination that medical monitoring is not viable as a cause of action if 
the remedy is a lump sum in Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley, and 
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting view that whether medical monitoring is a 
viable cause of action is "wholly distinct from the question of how to 
structure the remedy,"). 
165 Id. at 1710. 
166 Id. (providing an example of a store owner's duty to render aid to a 
customer injured by an instrumentality or employee of the store, or a drug 
dealer's duty to provide medical attention to a buyer as a result of the drugs). 
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completed wrong . . . ."167 This formulation conforms with society's 
expectations of the duty of care for handlers of dangerous products, 
conveniently eliminates the conceptual difficulties of medical monitoring as 
right versus remedy, and may mitigate the effect of individual causation 
issues on the class certification decision.168  
B. LITIGANTS SHOULD FRAME MEDICAL MONITORING 
REQUESTS AS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Since the proposed class in Meyer sought certification under 
52.08(b)(3), the Missouri Supreme Court did not address whether medical 
monitoring could be deemed injunctive.169 Dukes clarified that merely 
labeling the remedy "equitable" is insufficient for (b)(2) certification, as 
(b)(2) is limited to classes seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.170 Yet in 
most cases, medical monitoring is injunctive. The defendant must pay for the 
future costs associated with diagnosing and potentially preventing or 
                                                             
167 Id. at 1711 (emphasis added). For a helpful discussion of the 
repercussions of establishing this affirmative duty, see id. at 1711–15. 
168 See O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 359, 377 n.22 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that, where medical monitoring is an independent 
claim or cause of action, rather than a remedy, individual issues are avoided 
because "if the class prevailed on their claim, the defendant would necessarily 
be required to treat all class members alike, as all class members would then 
be eligible for the medical monitoring program by virtue of winning their 
medical monitoring claim"). 
169 See Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717–18 
(Mo. 2007). However, the court's statement that the plaintiffs "sought 
compensatory damages to establish a medical monitoring program," id. at 
714, seems to blur monetary and injunctive relief: compensatory damages are 
monetary, yet monitoring "programs" may be injunctive. See Day v. NLO, 
Inc., 144 F.R.D. 330, 335–36 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
170 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2560. 
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mitigating latent diseases.171 Thus, medical monitoring is not substitutionary; 
it does not replace expenses already accrued or the estimated value of lost 
health, but rather provides specific relief for preventative medicine.172 This 
specificity is a hallmark of injunctive remedies.173  
On this point, there is no logical reason to distinguish, as did the Day 
court, between defendant-supervised monitoring programs as "monetary," 
and court-supervised monitoring programs as "injunctive."174 In each case, 
the defendant is required to act affirmatively to defray the costs of monitoring 
required by its tortious conduct, possibly resulting in significant costs to the 
defendant.175 In a typical, non-toxic torts case, whether the presiding court 
simply issues an injunction requiring a defendant to act, or retains jurisdiction 
to supervise the defendant's actions, the fact is that in either case the 
underlying remedy is injunctive. In fact, courts often do not retain jurisdiction 
to oversee completion of their injunctive orders.176 For example, in the 
                                                             
171 See Venugopal, supra note 13, at 1668–70.  
172 See id. at 1667–68. Of course, the author does not consider lump 
sums in this analysis. 
173 See id. at 1666. 
174 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
175 The mere fact that a remedy is costly to a defendant is irrelevant to 
the legal/equitable determination: injunctions often involve significant costs 
to defendants. In perhaps the most notorious example, the Supreme Court in 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), affirmed an injunction of the 
construction of the Tellico Dam to prevent destruction of the endangered 
snail darter; when the case reached the district court, the Dam was 80% 
complete, and a permanent injunction would render unrecoverable $53 of $78 
million TVA had already expended. Id. at 166. 
176 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 645 F.3d 978 
(8th Cir. 2011) (affirming a preliminary injunction halting further 
construction of part of a coal-fired power plant in Arkansas where the district 
court did not retain jurisdiction to oversee the project's halt); Sierra Club v. 
Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539, 593 (D. Me. 1989).  
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"structural injunctions" used in educational reform and civil rights cases, 
courts retain jurisdiction to administer multi-phase injunctions where ongoing 
supervision is required.177 In contrast, medical monitoring programs likely 
involve initial determinations as to the type of treatment and diagnostics, 
which may not need to be revised unless a drastic change in technology, 
medication, or understanding of the latent disease emerges.178 There is no 
reason to believe that a defendant-supervised program could not fully serve 
the class' monitoring needs until such a change in circumstance arises, and 
allowing defendant-supervised programs as injunctions would avoid 
imposing the costs of administration on the courts.179 
Future litigants should consider filing under Rule 23(b)(2) and framing 
the request for relief as injunctive.180 The obvious benefit of labeling medical 
monitoring "injunctive" is that the proposed (b)(2) class could avoid the 
predominance inquiry. However, the implied "cohesiveness" requirement 
some courts apply to a (b)(2) analysis could be a potential barrier. 
Cohesiveness may be a stricter standard than even the predominance 
inquiry.181 Yet the appropriateness of a cohesiveness requirement for 
                                                             
177 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform 
Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1408, 1413 (2007). 
178 See In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., Accufix Atrial "J" Leads 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 172 F.R.D. 271, 284–87 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (certifying class 
where FDA-approved, defendant-supervised monitoring program already in 
place, primarily to review adequacy of program, not to take over 
administration). 
179 Shifting this cost from the courts to defendants would address some 
critics' concerns. See supra Part II.B. 
180 In fact, the plaintiffs in Ratliff filed under (b)(2), but were 
unsuccessful because the federal district court would not extend Meyer to 
products liability. See Ratliff v. Mentor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 
(W.D. Mo. 2008). 
181 See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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injunctive medical monitoring claims is questionable.182 Cohesiveness, as 
with predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3), is meant to ensure 
fairness to unnamed class members and judicial economy.183 Due process 
concerns for unnamed class members in mandatory (b)(2) classes are 
mitigated in the medical monitoring context because class members who 
develop actual, present injury will have their claims preserved and will be 
precluded from individual litigation only as to medical monitoring.184 Further, 
although the occasional class member may require an individual 
determination as to the appropriateness of a particular medical monitoring 
regime,185 monitoring programs are generally uniform in the diagnostics and 
examinations they incorporate.186 
                                                             
182 For a detailed analysis of cohesiveness in the context of medical 
monitoring, see Venugopal, supra note 13, at 1678–94. 
183 See id. at 1678. 
184 See id. at 1674–78 (noting that most courts addressing the issue of 
preclusion in the context of toxic torts have suspended the "single cause of 
action rule," which guards against impermissible claim-splitting, and 
critiquing objections). Courts can use their authority to issue orders limiting 
the preclusive effect of any negative judgment to medical monitoring, thereby 
preserving individual claims for actual injury. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d), 
V.A.M.R. 52.08(d); see Klonoff, supra note 122 (noting that, where a 
plaintiff cannot adequately represent the class for all claims, courts can issue 
orders preserving claims not appropriate for class treatment. This would be 
the case if a medical monitoring class had both actually and latently injured 
members). Similarly, under Rule 23(c)(4) and Missouri's Rule 52.08(c)(4), 
litigants may bring a class action as to the "particular issue" of medical 
monitoring, thereby avoiding preclusion of individual claims for actual 
injury. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4), V.A.M.R. 52.08(c)(4).  
185 See Gates, 655 F.3d at 268–69 (discussing how claimants with pre-
existing kidney disease could be harmed by proposed MRI screening). 
186 See Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 272; Venugopal, supra note 
13, at 1693 (noting that, "[m]onitoring programs may differ, if at all along a 
claimant's level or type of exposure to the same toxin, and in such a case, the 
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C. POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES  
As a final matter, although improbable, the Missouri legislature could 
take steps to fortify the likelihood of medical monitoring class actions to be 
certified when removed to federal courts by drafting a statutory cause of 
action.187 Federal judge-made rules cannot be interpreted to significantly 
affect the outcome of litigation based on state law,188 and federal procedural 
rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."189 Under a 
common law tort analysis, medical monitoring claimants inevitably face 
complicated causation and individual issues that may be preclusive to class 
certification by virtue of the commonality and predominance inquiry. 
However, if the legislature were to craft a statute imposing, for example, 
strict liability for medical monitoring on manufacturers that expose members 
of the public to particular doses of particular toxins, then as long as claimants 
demonstrate their exposure to the relevant dosage, certification might be 
                                                                                                                              
relief will likely vary according to a simple formula"). These dosage-based 
differences could even be avoided if the legislature created a statutory cause 
of action based on particular dosage thresholds. See supra Part V.C. 
187 Although it is unlikely that the Missouri legislature would enact the 
type of legislation proposed here, the author merely points out that, if the 
legislature had the political will to support medical monitoring claims, it has 
the authority to do so, and this authority may correspond with more 
protection in federal courts. 
188 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1442 (2010) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 
(1945)). 
189 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2006); Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (noting that the test for a procedural rule's validity 
"is not whether the rule affects a litigant's substantive rights; most procedural 
rules do. What matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it governs only 'the 
manner and the means' by which the litigants' rights are 'enforced,' it is valid; 
if it alters 'the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] 
rights,' it is not." (internal citations omitted)). 
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granted notwithstanding Dukes. This is because federal courts do not want to 
undermine "substantive" state law.190 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Dukes has muddied the relationship between Rule 23(a)(2) and 23(b), 
with potential watershed effects for all class actions in federal courts. Medical 
monitoring, as a product of mass torts with complicated causation issues, has 
faced, and will continue to face, an uphill battle to certification of class 
actions. Yet at least for suits in state court, Missouri can fortify medical 
monitoring as a valuable tool of recovery for victims of toxic exposure by 
reaffirming current class action jurisprudence and clarifying the limits and the 
theory of recovery for medical monitoring. In both federal and Missouri 
courts, litigants should frame requests for medical monitoring as injunctive 
relief under Rule 23(b)(2) to avoid the heightened predominance inquiry of 
(b)(3). Further, to guard against Dukes when Missouri citizens are inevitably 
dragged into federal courts by the relaxed removal standards of the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, the Missouri legislature could enact medical 
monitoring as a statutory cause of action, thereby providing a "substantive" 
right that cannot be undermined by federal procedural rules. Although these 
steps will not throw open the gates for certification of medical monitoring 
classes, they may at least preserve some viable claims from the downstream 
effects of Dukes, until Rule 23 is amended to once again clarify the 
distinction between commonality and predominance, or until environmental 
statutes are amended to acknowledge the social costs of pollution: neither of 
which are likely to happen soon. 
                                                             
190 But see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (noting that, under its test, 
the Supreme Court has rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule 
that has come before it, and holding New York's prohibition on penalty class 
actions, arguably a substantive limitation, was irrelevant to a Rule 23 analysis 
in federal court. Id. at 1437–38.). 
